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Abstract 
In this article, we develop a republican framework for relational animal ethics, 
recently popularized in Donaldson and Kymlicka’s Zoopolis. This republican 
framework departs from the focus on negative rights that dominate liberal animal 
rights theories, especially as concerns our relations to wild animals. Our proposed 
framework appeals to a republican standard of non-arbitrariness, or non-domination, 
for human interferences with such animals. This legitimation framework is more 
attentive to relations of care and of dependency between the species, which we 
contend fits the growing field of relational animal ethics. At the same time, it requires 
rigorous criteria be met to legitimate relations as non-dominating. We apply this 
framework to the morality of the supplementary feeding of wildlife, using a case 
study of wild boars as fed by hunters. Weakening of the concept of domination to fit 
the predicament of boars, we show how the republican framework can provide a 




An alternative to the negative rights slant in animal rights, focusing on abolition and 
hands-off approaches, has now surfaced within critical animal studies (Mackenzie and Natalie 
2000; Friedman 2008). Indeed, Relational Animal Rights Theory (henceforth RART) lays a 
foundation for positive relations of care, mutuality and dependence between species. In so doing, 
the theory is sensitive to the multitude of ways in which human and non-human animals interact 
across shared territories. Perhaps the most fruitful development with RART is offered by 
Donaldson and Kymlicka (2011), insofar as it extends a positive relation also to wild animals. 
They present a tripartite framework for moral obligations toward non-human animals based on 
our relation to them in the political community. Here domestic, liminal and wild animals are co-
citizens, denizens and sovereigns respectively. This tripartite framework defines our moral 
obligations towards non-humans and their corresponding political rights.  
In this article, we argue Donaldson and Kymlicka’s framework is compelling insofar as it 
stipulates positive duties in a field that has been dominated by negative rights (Rogers and 
Kaplan 2004). But we also believe that their proposed integration of negative rights and positive 
duties intuitively points in the direction of republican political theory rather than the liberal vein 
in which they write. Indeed, republicanism proposes this same integration of negative rights and 
positive duties, while arguing for a relational conception of justice as freedom from domination 
by others (Pettit 1996). We aim to develop an animal rights connection to republicanism and non-
domination within the context of the RART envisioned by Donaldson and Kymlicka. But we also 
believe, in accordance with several other critics (Cochrane 2013; Horta 2013; Hinchcliffe 2015; 
Ladwig 2015), that Donaldson and Kymlicka have been insufficiently attentive to problems of 
applying key political concepts in this context of human and non-human relations, such as 
sovereignty and representation.  
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Indeed, the problems here are closely interrelated: sovereigns can be represented to the 
extent that they can accept or reject others as their representatives. In republican language, 
representations of sovereigns are legitimate only to the extent they can be effectively contested 
by those represented. Needless to say, effective contestation is out of bounds for wild animals, 
who lack the cognitive and communicative capacities requisite for legitimate relations of 
contestable representation between humans and non-humans (Eckersley 1999; Smith 2012). 
Contesting on behalf of non-communicative others to secure their freedom from domination does, 
however, currently takes place for the marginal cases of humans such as the cognitively disabled 
and some elders (Silvers and Francis 2005). This is provided those claims made resonate with 
others (i.e. they are not conjured out of the air) and are contestable by communicatively 
competent agents (Saward 2006). We believe, then, that there are contestable and therefore 
legitimate ways in which humans may represent non-humans, including wild animals. 
 The feeding of wild animals provides a case study of human interference for our 
philosophical argument. We analyze the sustained supplementary feeding of wild boars (Sus 
scrofa) by hunters in light of a republican standard of justification as non-dominating interference 
(Pettit 1997). Does feeding practice satisfy the standard for interference in a wild animal 
community with which humans are interrelated? In the case of supplementary feeding that we 
focus on, the practice is typically done to facilitate the hunting and killing of boars for sport and 
culling their high numbers (Geisser and Reyer 2004). This lack of a benign intent behind the 
interference, indeed a kind of deception and a violation of the duty of fidelity in the language of 
Taylor (1992), suggests a prima facie case for saying supplemental feeding of wild boars 
constitutes a relation of domination. Nonetheless, we ask in accordance with republican criteria: 
(1) whether or to what extent it might satisfy the republican standard of non-dominating 
interference by respecting the good of the wild boar community; and (2) whether the practice of 
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feeding is checked by appropriate accountability mechanisms preventing it from lapsing into 
unjustifiable, dominating interference in this wild animal community.  
 Our line of argumentation requires us to reinterpret the concept of domination in order to 
take into account that boars do not, as Donaldson and Kynlicka would argue, constitute a 
sovereign community as characterized by moral powers of self-determination (Cochrane 2013). 
This leads us to develop an idea of agentless domination (Lovett 2010): the domination of those 
who cannot conceptualize or communicate their good or contest different and opposing 
judgments as to how it is best understood in a given context of dispute. With respect to the 
contestability of the human/non-human relation, we develop the idea of proxy or dependent 
representative claim-making on behalf of wild animals. Donaldson and Kymlicka endorse this 
model for co-citizens, but fail to extend it to wild animals (Cochrane 2013). Proxy representation 
is a political process in which human disputants discursively construct the good of the wild boars 
in different contestable ways (Saward 2006). Here, we argue that determining whether public 
decisions regarding the continuation, stopping, or regulation of feeding for the boars satisfy the 
standard of non-arbitrary interference will be a function of robust critical deliberative processes 
of claim-making.  
Determining the moral status of supplementary feeding of wild game is urgent not least 
from a republican-based RART perspective. But its legitimacy is also inseparable from the 
legitimacy of hunting in contemporary society. While public acceptance of hunting is very high at 
86 percent in Sweden (Gadolin 2014) when compared to continental European states and North 
America (Peterson 2004), the supplementary feeding of wild boars raises ethical concerns over 
the extent of our stewardship. Practices that confuse political relations in the shared interspecies 
community, or Zoopolis, may risk eroding the public perception of both hunters and wild boars.  
5 
 
This paper is divided into four sections. First, we describe the feeding issue in Sweden. 
Second, we determine the political status of wild boars and engage with hunters’ defences of 
feeding as affirming natural relations between the species. Third, we frame the feeding issue 
within the republican framework to determine its legitimacy. Fourth and finally, we tackle some 
key objections to framing the issue in republican terms. We situate our discussion within 
emerging scholarship within Relational Animal Rights Theory (RART), pioneered by Midgley 
(1983) and taken further by Burgess-Jackson (1998), Scruton (2000), Palmer (2012) and not least 
Donaldson and Kymlicka (2011), whom we credit for providing our point of departure. Our 
republican slant to animal rights provides a forward-looking framework that might challenge the 
liberal preoccupation with negative duties currently stifling the field (Clement 2003; Horta 2013). 
Our discussion is intended not just as a contribution to RART and to the ‘political turn’ in animal 
rights, but also as a call to wildlife managers and hunters to reassess the legitimacy of 
supplemental feeding practices. 
 
2. The feeding issue 
Supplementary feeding refers to the provision of natural or artificial feed, commonly 
grain, fruit or vegetables but in some cases animalist by-products or processed foods to wild 
animals (Dunkley and Cattet 2003). Feeding can be on a supplementary, emergency, winter or 
intercept nature, where the latter refers to feeding as a diversionary tactic that leads wildlife away 
from crops or human settlements (Dunkley and Cattet, 2003; Geisser and Reyer 2004). The most 
valued and common form of supplementary feeding among Swedish hunters is that of roe deer in 
the winter months. Among members of the public, by contrast, bird-feeding is extensive and not 
generally regarded as an interference in the wild, reflected in its scale and ubiquity across the 
western world (Jones and Reynolds 2008). 
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Supplementary feeding is substantially less regulated in Sweden than in other parts of 
Europe where more detailed restrictions apply. This paucity of regulation can be attributed to the 
proviso ‘freedom with responsibility’ that characterises Swedish hunting. As part of the 2014 
review of the hunting law, which comprises feeding regulation, a prohibition of supplementary 
feeding of wildlife is proposed during non-winter months. Even during other seasons, the new 
legislation seems to indicate it will be easier to impose local prohibitions on feeding from the 
County Administrative Board, unless satisfactory agreements can be reached between landowners 
and hunters.  
Of all the fed wild species, wild boars are rapidly proliferating in Southern and Middle 
Sweden (Lemel and Truve 1999). This is attributed to a combination of boars having only 
humans as predators, being notoriously difficult to shoot, rejuvenating multiple times per year, 
and suffering no negative consequences of density dependency, while enjoying extensive 
supplementary feeding of all sorts of foods (Leaper, Massei, Gorman and Aspinall 1999; Bieber 
and Ruf 2005; Borowik, Curnlier and Jędrzejewska 2013). The population explosion of boars is 
reflected across the European continent where they are now the second most abundant ungulate 
and the most rapidly multiplying species (Keuling, Stier and Mechtild 2009; Apollonio, 
Andersen, Reidar and Putman, 2010; Ucarli 20111). This is globally paralleled by feral pigs in 
Australia, invasive swine in the US, and crop-raiding warthogs in parts of Africa (Hampton, 
Spencer, Alpers, Twigg, Woolnough,Doust, Higgs and Pluske, 2014; Littin and Mellor 2005; 
Massei, Coats, Quy, Storer and Cowan 2010; Parkes, Ramsey, Macdonald, Walker, McKnight, 
Cohen and Morrison 2010). 
The damage done to agricultural crops by boar tusks when feeding, raising piglets or 
using cropland as shelter, is reportedly extensively (Geisser and Reyer 2004; Herrero, García-
Serrano, Couto, Ortuño, and García-González 2006; Ucarli, 2011).  Farmers object to feeding as 
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boars overpopulate rural areas and destroy crops. Ecologists by and large caution against such a 
degree of human interference with feeding patterns of wildlife. Indeed, the cascade effects of 
their proliferation and simultaneous dependency on human intervention are either uncertain or 
may wreak ecological havoc (Brittingham and Temple 1992; Fischer; Stallknecht, Luttrell, Page; 
Dhondt and Converse 1997; Dunkley and Cattet 2003; Jones, 2011)  
Hunters, on the other hand, are generally pro supplementary feeding and go to great 
lengths to provide for their game. Their rationale is that it facilitates hunting the boars by 
concentrating the distribution of game to feeding stations (Geisser and Reyer 2004). Hunters also 
claim supplementary feeding minimizes the suffering that would face many starving boars in the 
winter. This satisfies their conscience, knowing that wild animals survive the winter months. All 
in all, the arguments of hunters have engendered a vexed socio-political situation wherein 
supplementary feeding of a thriving, partly invasive population has become a frequent source of 
conflict between hunters and farmers sharing the countryside. 
 
2.1.The political status of wild boars 
Donaldson AND Kymlicka’s (2011) argument is that the duties owed to wild boars are a function 
of our position in relation to them in the political community. Animals are ‘domestic,’ ‘liminal,’ 
or ‘wild’ which are tantamount to ‘citizen,’ ‘denizen,’ and ‘sovereign’ respectively. Our duties 
toward sovereigns involve protecting their autonomy without exploitative or paternalistic outside 
interference. It requires that we recognize that wild animals have the inclination, the capacity and, 
above all, the right to form autonomous sustaining communities. That is not to say we cannot or 
should not offer aid and assistance or, in extreme cases, intervention—especially if we are 
somehow causally responsible for their predicament. To clarify this, Donaldson and Kymlicka 
(2011) distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate intervention, where the former restores the 
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realization of the species’ sovereignty, while the latter creates dependency. In their argument, 
intentionally creating dependency on humans is what is unjustifiable. This is in contrast to 
Taylor’s (1992) interpretation. Feeding wild animals and culling them at these sites would clearly 
violate both the duty of non-interference with wild animals and the duty of fidelity, meaning not 
to deceive wild animals.  
For all intents and purposes, wild boars begin as sovereigns in Donaldson and Kymlicka’s 
framework, who shun interaction with humans. Respecting this, humans have previously 
honoured their “natural competence” and capacity for survival (Regan 1983) by not interfering in 
their predation, feeding or breeding cycles. Although having started from a position as 
sovereigns, we contend boars have now moved increasingly toward denizenship. This follows 
from their dependency on human-provided foods and their resultant routine transgression on 
human settlements. In this way, their denizenship is partly something we have caused, but also a 
natural result of their dispersal following increased populations. As denizens who interact or 
make use of human resources, their crop raiding behaviour have inscribed them with labels of 
pests and parasites, and they are termed ‘pig devils’ in some parts of Southern Sweden 
(Johansson 2005). An important corollary of their moving toward denizenship is that boars are 
becoming subjects in regards to whom it is thought justifiable to suspend our moral obligations. 
This much is often the case for varmint (Lukasik and Alexander 2011). In this regard they are 
paralleled by the status of undocumented immigrants or a rabble population—they are neither 
owed the duties commanded by pets as co-citizens, nor the respect for autonomy owed to 
sovereign wildlife.  
Nonetheless, hunters defend supplementary feeding by first purporting that the size of 
wildlife populations are best regulated through hunting at this point and not through starvation. 
Culling at feeding stations is presented as the most efficient and humane way of dealing with the 
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boars. To be sure, hunters who practice supplementary feeding of wild boars kill three times as 
many boars as those who do not (Dunkley and Cattet 2003; Geisser and Reyer 2004). This higher 
kill-ratio reflects an interesting fault line between bird feeding and game feeding. Where the 
former is linked to promoting values of conservation (Green and Higginbottom 2000), the latter 
appears to cultivate a stronger predation ethic (Dunkley and Cattet 2003).  
The hunters that defend the management of wild boars through feeding and culling as the 
more humane alternative join a prominent utilitarian narrative within hunting ethics. Namely, that 
it is less painful for an animal to die from a swift gunshot by a skilled hunter than it is from 
disease, starvation, or natural predation in the wild (Loftin 1984; Everett 2001; Svendsen 
Bjørkdahl 2005; Cahoone 2009). Hunters are consequently presumed ethical by intervening to 
remedy nature’s ‘grisly drama’ (Sagoff 1984; Hettinger 1994; Samuel 1999). In Swedish, it is 
arguably significant that that the term for game management is the equivalent of ‘wildlife care’. 
Critics of the duty-to-prevent-suffering argument, however, suggest hunters’ self-representation 
as “Florence Nightingales with rifles” (Kerasote 1994) is a sanitization of something that is 
motivated by more esoteric drivers than doing what is best for the animals.  
A second defence of supplementary feeding offered by hunters is to highlight the moral 
inconsistencies of feeding certain species and withholding this intervention from others. Here, 
they may contend bird-feeding is a sufficiently popular practice that it imparts virtue to providing 
for wild animals through harsh times. Or, they may argue that proliferation of the great tit (Parus 
major), a commonly fed wild species in the country, is not producing observable damage in the 
same way as do the wild boars. But, even if the tit’s impact is not conspicuously nuisant to 
humans, it is obviously false to presume that proliferation has no such negative effects on other 
species; or indeed, the ecosystem of which they form a part (Brittingham and Temple 1988).  
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Third, hunters might defend supplementary feeding by arguing for the intrinsic virtue of 
stewarding wild animals. Orams (2002) declares that the sharing of food with animals is a 
spiritual, reciprocal, and natural parenting response across human cultures. Feminist scholars in 
particular have embraced this refrain, critiquing the hands-off approaches advocated by the 
liberal, justice-based slant to animal rights (Noddings 1984; Curtin 1991; Clement 2003). Their 
views are substantiated by anthropologists who posit that the provision of small amounts of food 
to attract wildlife has in all likelihood featured in human settlements for millennia (Kellert 1997). 
It is only in recent decades that this feature of human settlement has become extensive, 
commercialized and linked to game management practices (Chinery 2004). It is easy to challenge 
this argument, however, as guilty of the naturalistic fallacy on two related fronts. To wit, neither 
historical precedence nor human biology can offer a cosmic sanction for a human cultural 
practice (Bateson 1989; Moriarty and Woods 1997).  
Fourth and finally, hunters might appeal to biocentrist ethics by arguing that they value 
the well-being of individual animals with whom some sort of relation is established (as local 
residents or symbionts) above that of abstract cascade effects that may occur within the 
ecosystem, as a result of interference with food cycles. While a prima facie questionable 
justification, this is certainly the worldview taken by many bird-feeding members of the public. 
Those wild animals they can see outside their window take precedence over abstract 
contingencies and interspecies dynamics, such as the well-fed great tit out-competing other birds 
for nesting sites.  
Indeed, the public might not approach any ecocentrist outlook until feeding wildlife 
becomes a large-scale, impersonal enterprise. At this point, morality shifts from ‘playing angel’ 
in prosaic small-scale interventions with proximate others to ‘playing god’ in systemic 
intervention (Henderson 2009). These arguments considered, we agree with scholars that one 
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should be somewhat cautious about attributing kindness and sensitivity to hunters along the 
above lines of argumentation (Wood Jr. 1996; Luke 1997). Such kindness, after all, is difficult to 
reconcile with the principles that sanction killing. 
 
3. Appeals to non-domination – feeding in republican theory 
3.1.The problem of sovereignty  
If we accept the originally sovereign status of wild boars, we make some tenuous 
assumptions that necessarily accompany the application of human political concepts to non-
human animals. For one, it might be argued that in assigning them statuses of citizenship or 
sovereignty, we inadvertently bind them to certain obligations and standards that they have 
neither asked for nor have the capacity to fulfill (Scruton 2000). Second, and more importantly, 
we imply wild boars as sovereigns possess a meaningful concept of self-determination, in the 
sense of a “normatively defined authority structure existing within a community.” (Wadiwel, 
2013). But such a conception of sovereignty is difficult to discern in most animal cases. Indeed, 
in response to Zoopolis, scholars now seriously question the utility of applying the sovereignty 
concept to animals (Cochrane 2013; Horta 2013; Hinchcliffe 2015; Ladwig 2015). While some 
wild animals do possess authority structures that regulate important aspects of their lives, 
including predation, reproduction and migration (Palmer, 2012), the normative and conceptual 
implications of sovereignty requires a shared collective interest in self-determination. This is 
beyond even pack animals’ social horizon of orientation (Ladwig 2015). In the case of wild 
boars, there are few, if any, abiding qualifying structures in their communities that we know of.
i
 
Donaldson and Kymlicka respond this concern by expanding the concept of sovereignty 
from beyond legal institutions, while having sovereignty fulfill the same function: a principled 
and pragmatic argument for preventing injustices against the wilderness (Donaldson and 
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Kymlicka 2015). For them, sovereignty as understood in the animal case now merely entails 1) an 
independent existence, 2) upon which value is placed, 3) resistance to alien rule and 4) the 
possession of recognisable interests in their social organization. These criteria for sovereignty 
could reasonably apply to wild boars. Indeed, Donaldson and Kymlicka would likely contend by 
appeal to the ideas of MacKinnon (2005) that boars demonstrate their sovereignty not by 
collective self-determination, but by “voting with their feet;” or, in this case hooves, insofar as 
they shun human interference. But this seems to us, to divest sovereignty of its essential 
institutional political features. We therefore contend the wild boar population can be understood 
as qualifying as a community, but not a sovereign body. In this respect, the boar community is not 
dissimilar to the marginal cases of humans in terms of their lack of voice and lack of political 
autonomy (Eckersley 1999; Wong 2010).  
If, like Horta (2013), we take community as a weakened form of sovereignty, and, like 
Hinchcliffe (2015), members as weakened forms of citizens, then by parity of reasoning what we 
should be concerned with is protecting the goods of its members and protecting them from 
domination, and not the elusive, political marker of sovereignty that does not meaningfully obtain 
for most animal cases. Indeed, sovereignty obscures interferences which are consistent with the 
ends of the community by appealing to a violation of a non-existent authority structure. To 
overcome this, we need a more appropriate theory of interference that admits of human 
obligations to legitimate the act.  
 
3.2.The solution of republicanism 
We began by noting that the political turn in animal rights, and indeed now even in 
RART, is characterised by a liberal framework that overwhelmingly works with negative 
freedoms. But we believe republicanism to be a better fit for the types of positive, relational 
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rights and duties that arise in the shared interspecies community. Republicanism has enjoyed a 
revival in political philosophy that understands freedom as embracing collective membership, 
intersubjective reason and rights of contestation (Allen 2011; Benton 2011). It locates freedom 
not in the absence of interferences but in a state of non-domination, which is achieved insofar as 
the subject is free from arbitrary interference with his or her actions (Pettit 1996; Pettit 2001). To 
the extent that this is a perspective that can clarify the legitimacy of interferences with wild 
animals, the republican conception of freedom can be distinguished from the liberal negative 
freedom through the example of guards in wildlife parks dominating the animals under their 
supervision.  
In this scenario, even if they are permitted to live their lives absent interference, the 
animals in the park remain utterly subject to the arbitrary will of the guard (Ladwig 2015). 
Indeed, by itself, the liberal criterion of non-interference offers no principled guidance as to 
whether or not interference by the guard is justified to secure an animal’s good when this is 
jeopardized by any number of contingencies. In other words, it is insufficiently sensitive to tell us 
when there is something wrong with the negative stance of the guard, and why the latter should 
be bound by positive obligations of interference. To be sure, the guard may resort to ad hoc 
pragmatic or consequentialist reasons to act on behalf of the animals, but remains a dominator as 
long as these responses lack any well-defined principled justification. In this respect, republican 
theory demands that important criteria relating to the subject’s good and the contestability of the 
relation are met. Moreover, these are criteria that cannot be subsumed under Donaldson and 
Kymlicka’s appeal to the sovereignty of wild animals for reasons we shall further develop 
shortly, which concern the limited cognitive capacities of animals such as the boars.  
The first criterion to freedom from domination may be attained if the interference is 
consistent with the good of the subject. To clarify, when countries provide emergency aid to other 
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sovereign states in times of crisis interference is exercised towards those states as self-
determining subjects (Ladwig 2015). But interference and dependency are hardly breaches of 
sovereignty in this case. Instead, they are consistent with the common good of those who 
comprise that subject as a national people having suffered some calamity. But a similar point can 
also be made without reference to the idea of sovereignty in the very different case of dependent 
children. After all, few would contest that parents caring for their children through their 
development into adults constitutes a case of arbitrary, dominating interference. Few would 
contest this given that positive interference is exercised non-arbitrarily in their best interest, as 
immature humans with decidedly limited capacities for sovereign self-determination.  
As for the second criterion, non-domination can be secured through self-initiated 
accountability mechanisms that check the arbitrariness of the interference. These include public 
justification, public contestation, and retribution (Benton 2014). Here, the non-arbitrariness of 
interference may be justified through a combination of tracking common interests and holding 
open the permanent possibility of contestation on behalf of others. So, interference through 
foreign aid is subject to oversight by NGOs and IGOs, whose judgments are publicly contestable. 
Would-be interferers are held accountable for how they interfere by those who experience their 
interference as domination taking their grievances for adjudication in international courts. Or, 
regarding dependent children lacking developed powers of autonomy and self-determination, 
parental interference may still constitute non-domination to the extent it can be appropriately 
checked by publicly contestable child protection laws.  
 
3.3 The Species Good of Wild Boars 
The contestability of the interference with wild boars means little unless we can show that 
it promotes the ‘common good’ of the subject. How might we understand the impact of 
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supplemental feeding on the common good of wild boars? ‘The species norm’ might be the 
closest approximation of the good presented so far (Rollin 1992; Nussbaum 2006). This is 
developed in response to errors necessarily associated with conceiving of the good at the 
individual biocentrist level and the ecosystemic level respectively. To exemplify this, Rolston III 
(1985) argues that, at the level of the individual organism, even reproduction may be unnecessary 
as it entails duress, risk, and energy expenditure. This would skew the argument heavily in favor 
of supplementary feeding as an immediate, short-term good for the hungry boar, but that is too 
simplistic. Conversely, if viewed ecocentrically, the common good of the boars might be the 
cessation, or gradual phasing out, of supplementary feeding to ensure that the population returns 
to the actual carrying capacity of the environment. But this would necessarily entail sacrificing 
individuals, which is difficult to reconcile with the common good of the wild boar species. 
The species norm instead proceeds on a middle-ground and eschews the pitfalls of the 
biocentrist and ecocentrist perspectives respectively. It is a good that can be apprehended without 
the insider perspective of the organism (Rollin 1992). It can be identified by observing that certain 
activities constitutively contribute to their well-being as a species (Ladwig 2015). The 
anthropocentrism inherent to ascertaining the species norm of any non-human animal is 
counteracted to the extent that studies are grounded in close observation and an openness of 
perspective that can cultivate an understanding of their particular needs (Donovan 2006). Where 
wild boars are concerned, the species thrives when rooting, foraging, wallowing in dirt or against 
trees, feeding from diverse foods given their omnivore status and adaptability. Moreover, they are 
social creatures who synchronise birth and nursing behavior within matriarchal units. Mindful of 
this, what does the interference of supplemenary feeding do to these goods?   
 
3.4 Justifying Interference with the common good of boars 
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Ways in which supplemental feeding would violate the species norm of boars and present 
a relation of domination include the following. The good of boars would be inhibited to the extent 
that supplementary feeding compromised their natural behaviour or frustrated their preferences 
for the abovementioned activities (Horta 2013). If feeding limited the range of things they could 
do and food sources from which they could forage, their options would be frustrated, and such 
restrictions are immoral (Bell 2006). For example, we will have interfered with their common 
good if the following effects were demonstrated. First, if supplementary feeding resulted in wild 
boars becoming less wary of humans in a way that might endanger them. Second, if we found 
that boars suffered any of the negative physiological or pathological effects of supplementary 
feeding purported in some research reports. These include stress from overcrowding at stations, 
the spread of diseases, or placing them at risk from lurking predators (Fischer; Stallknecht, 
Luttrell, Page; Dhondt and Converse 1997; Orams 2002; Dunkley and Cattet 2003).  
Third, if a pathological adaptation to feeding stations contributed to a loss in capacity for 
natural foraging behavior. Ordinarily, the provision of supplementary feeding to an omnivore 
with a wide range of choices of feed would not impose high exit costs on the dependent subject 
(Lovett 2010). Exit costs pertain to the harms of deprivation associated with leaving the relation. 
As Wall (2001) asserts:  
 
…submission to the arbitrary will of another does not really constitute being 
dominated by the other if one is perfectly free to walk away from the 
relationship whenever one wants without incurring any significant costs. (51) 
 
Because of wild boars’ opportunism and flexibility (Lindblom 2011), they could sustain 
themselves by alternating between their diverse natural food sources: leaves, bark, insects, 
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earthworms, bird eggs, frogs, fish, roots, tubers, nuts, and a range of crops including maize, 
wheat, and sugar beets (Wilson 2004; Herrero, García-Serrano, Couto, Ortuño, Vicente and 
García-González 2006). The exit costs for wild boars from this feeding relation then are relatively 
low compared, for example, to koala bears who feed exclusively on Eucalyptus trees. 
Nonetheless, we caution against appealing to the criterion of exit costs for determining 
domination, as we advocate abandoning the concept of sovereignty with respect to boars. Boars 
lack the necessary authority structures and critical faculties to exercise choice in walking away 
from the interference. Presented with easily accessible, high starch foods, they will automatically 
prefer these offerings. In the winter months, these sources will be even more attractive in 
comparison to the poor prospects elsewhere. Here, Lovett (2010) terms the presence of dismal 
choice (or in the boar’s case, no choice) a case of agentless domination, in virtue of creating a 
relation of de facto dependence.  
So far however, feeding has not resulted in any of the aforementioned side-effects. Boars 
have no natural predators that can take advantage of their vulnerablity, apart from humans.
ii
 To 
borrow Palmer’s (2010) terminology, they are no less wild in the dispositional sense than before 
because they now feed at secluded forest stations. Indeed, they are a notoriously rare sight even 
by hunters’ admissions. No sick boars have been uncovered, indeed the hardy stomach of the 
boar makes it apt to withstand the bacteria associated with feeding from the ground. There is only 
ever one pack of boars at the feeding station at any one time because boars are naturally shy and 
live in matriarchal units. They do not seem to mind crowding around their siblings for food or 
suffer density dependence (Magnusson 2010; Borowik, Curnlier and Jędrzejewska 2013). The 
one concern raised by wildlife managers in Sweden is that boars that regularly feed on sugar 
beets or unlawfully provided pastries risk sustaining cavities (Sveriges Radio, 2007)  
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Finally, we must ask whether the presence of viable accountability mechanisms can 
render the interference of maintaining or stopping feeding non-arbitrary. On the one hand, 
justification refers to the tracking of common interests in the policy-making process, while 
accountability is an ex post mechanism that sanctions breaches of these interests. These two 
mechanisms pose few problems in the context of promoting the common interests of boars 
because they are administered by agents other than the hunters: for instance, the Swedish 
Environmental Protection Agency (SEPA), but also the criminal justice system in which boar 
feeding related offenses have been prosecuted in accordance with the hunting decree 
(Naturtidning 2004; Willsäter 2013). But, on the other hand, contestation requires self-initiation 
on the part of those who believe themselves to be the victims of dominating interference. This 
raises the altogether obvious problem that boars are not intentional agents who are capable of 
undertaking contestations addressed to the SEPA or criminal courts. To the extent they 
themselves are not intentional agents capable of self-initiation, the boars necessarily poses a 
problem of agent-less domination for anyone who would undertake contestations on their behalf 
in these fora. Nonetheless, we believe that it is reasonable to compensate for the absence of 
boars’ intentionality and capability to address legal and political institutions by motivating a form 
of proxy contestation. This requires human proxies for boars to approximate and extrapolate from 
their perspectives in order to determine and promote their best interests when making 
contestations of current policy on their behalf. Donaldson and Kymlicka contend that such ‘trust 
models’ (Silvers and Francis 2005) in the form of ombudsmen, trustees, and advocates can 
exercise non-human animals’ voice in institutional fora. We belive their reasoning is sound on 
this point. In Sweden, the SEPA rules on many hunting decisions, and nearly all wildlife 
management issues. But these rulings can be effectively contested by animal rights offices and 
animal welfare NGOs, possessing considerable power to ensure that the rights and interests of 
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future generations and non-humans are heard as non-communicating co-citizens and liminals 
(Epstein and Darpö 2013).  
 
4. Objections to the Republican Framework 
In our introduction, we contended that Donaldson and Kymlicka's (2011) liberal political 
framework for RART points towards the republican standard that human interferences with non-
humans should be non-arbitrary and non-dominating. In the above section, we subsequently re-
apprehend interference in light of this standard. But this still leaves us with a range of difficulties 
accommodating non-human animals within the human parameters of political concepts, as 
characteristic of RART and the political turn. Consequently, we now critically engage some 
objections to using these concepts for understanding our relations and obligations to non-humans. 
We have already indicated problems with Donaldson and Kymlicka’s appeal to the concept of 
sovereignty. We now turn to further complications regarding the boars’ lack of moral powers and 
their lack of an authority structure. We also consider the problem of free will as it is understood 
in the animal context and some of the limitations of pursuing proxy contestation on their behalf.  
 First, Pettit’s concept of domination as arbitrary interference necessarily involves 
overriding the moral powers of other humans for autonomous self-determination. It interferes 
with their ability to make revisable life-plans that are respectful one another’s freedom and so 
become the captains of their own fate (Rawls 2005; Pettit 1996). But how does this apply to the 
boars? Do they possess functionally equivalent moral powers that could be overridden in such a 
way that they may be said to suffer domination? We have contended that wild boars indeed 
possess subjective goods and the capacity to comply with a certain degree with social cooperation 
defining their common species-life. However, they cannot conceptualize their future selves or 
formulate any revisable plan of life based on that conceptualization. Given the more limited form 
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of moral powers they possess, boars cannot communicate to us their subjective goods in the 
manner of other humans capable of exercising the moral powers of self-determination in a system 
of just cooperation.  
 This creates a problem regarding the cognitive dimension to domination. Earlier, we 
argued that the animals in a nature park are dominated because of the guard’s potential to 
interfere arbitrarily. But this example differs from the key example of domination in the 
republicanism literature—the relation of human master and human slave. Here, the slave is 
dominated by the master because of the former is able to anticipate that the latter can interfere 
arbitrarily, at any time (Pettit 1996). Indeed, it is this ability to conceptualize future interference 
that keeps the slave cowed and impedes his ability to use his moral powers to formulate a plan of 
life. But boars cannot anticipate arbitrary interference, and so prima facie it would seem that they 
cannot be dominated in this cognitivist sense. Hence, the application of the concept of 
domination to the boars calls for a departure from a condition of Pettit’s theory: that the 
dominated must possess sovereign powers of self-determination, which can be overridden by a 
dominator. Consequently, we must appeal to domination in a suitably weakened form that relaxes 
Pettit’s condition that the domination entails an ability to anticipate arbitrary interference.  
Adjusted to agentless domination in Lovell’s (2010) sense, we believe this weakened 
form is consistent with idea of domination as arbitrary interference in a range of marginal human 
cases. These include the severely cognitively disabled (Wong 2010), future generations of 
humans (Nolt 2011), children (Wilson 2001), in addition to some elders as subjects of 
domination. In these marginal human cases, interference may be arbitrary and dominating, but 
not because the cognitively disabled, future generations, and so on, are prevented from exercising 
their sovereign powers of self-determination by formulating revisable life-plans. All are cases of 
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agentless or weak domination, in which the dominated lack these powers either entirely or in 
some substantial degree.  
Previously, we acknowledged that the inability of boars to contest could be resolved by 
appeal to proxy contestation. Indeed, we now argue that this would proceed along the same lines 
as proxy contestation for future generations and other marginal cases. By analogy with boars, the 
latter cannot exercise their permanent possibility of contestation on account of not yet having 
been born, but they are not withheld the right to have this right exercised through proxies. But the 
analogy here is imperfect. Can boars be said to have the right to permanent possibility 
contestation through proxies? That is, can they be said to have such a right, given that they are 
complete creations who will never develop the cognitive capacities to contest by their own lights 
(Scruton 2000)? Unlike children and future generations, boars do not possess the potential to 
develop and become full moral members of society. In other words, they do not possess the 
potential for self-intitiation and self-determination. Not possessing this potential, they cannot be 
said to have a right to proxy contestation. 
According to this objection, it is inappropriate to approximate similarities between 
marginal cases and animals. Indeed, it is tantamount to an anthropormpophism that attributes far 
too much ‘humanity’ to animals (Murdy 1998) and may be offensive to marginal humans. But 
this critique is difficult to substantiate. It is premised on a Cartesian blind that arbitrarily separes 
humans from non-human animals (Noske 2004). Even at cost of affording a higher moral status 
to severely cognitively disabled humans compared to animals that display cognitive capacities at 
times greater than those of marginal humans in certain selected tasks (Rogers and Kaplan 2004). 
There is now ample evidence not only of unique forms of animal intelligence, but of the present 
inability of humans to transcend human mediated systems of interpreting these expressions 
(Driessen 2014). Anthropocentrism thus challenges the analogy at a fundamental level (Noske 
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1997), including the narrow ways in which cognition is currently understood and tested (Rogers 
and Kaplan 2004). We believe, then, that objections to this analogy on the basis that wild boars 
possess lower cognitive capacity as conventionally interpreted, or that as non-human animals 
they are fundamentally outside of the moral realm inhabited by marginal humans, are misguided.  
Wild boars are on an equal moral footing with cognitively disabled humans insofar as 
they constitute moral patients to whom the rest of us are interrelated and to whom we owe 
obligations of care and respect. As moral patients, boars may be said to care about what happens 
to themselves without knowing that they do so. In simplest possible terms, they care about rolling 
in the mud, grubbing for roots, etc.—all those activities we equated with their good as a species. 
But they do not conceptualize these activities as for their good or formulate any life-plans on the 
basis of such higher-order conceptualizations (neither do marginal cases). At least, if they do, it is 
not something to which current cognition tests, however flawed, can testify. But this should not 
be a barrier and much less the cause for withholding of rights. Caring about their good without 
knowing it, their behaviors are purposive in the sense of aiming to fulfil those goods that they 
cannot, to our limited knowledge, conceptualize. Having purposes is the key to having the right 
to freedom (Gerwith 1978), even on the level of purposiveness exhibited by moral patients.  
Indeed, the argument from marginal human cases demonstrates that we cannot easily deny 
moral patients the right to proxy contestation over their freedom. We certainly acknowledge that 
we are related to cognitively disabled humans in ways that create obligations towards them. We 
also acknowledge that it would be unacceptable to arbitrarily interfere with their enjoyments of 
goods they cannot conceptize as their goods on the basis of such cognitive or communicative 
deficits. Instead, we see it as morally encumbent on us to identify those goods appropriate to their 
range of characteristic purposive activites and to modulate our behaviors in relationship to them, 
according to our determination of their good. Indeed, for us to arbitrarily interfere with their 
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purposive activities in pursuit of goods they can neither articulate nor communicate to us would 
surely amount to domination, albeit in the weakened form we identified above.  
Consequently, we now say that domination in the weak form consists of arbitrary 
interference not with the self-chosen life-plans of rational agents with capacities for self-
determination, but rather arbitrary interference with the good of any creature with whom we are 
interrelated. This is domination in the weak form consisting in arbitrary interference with a 
creature’s good, as identified by virtue of careful observation of its characteristic set of purposive 
behaviours (Gudorf 2010). In the case of boars, this means that careful observation and 
identification of their species-good becomes the basis of proxy contestations of arbitrary or 
dominating interference. Such proxy contestations thus compensate for their inability to articulate 
their own good and to make use of this communicatively as the basis of self-intitiated 
contestations.  
It might still be objected, though, that the boars cannot contest how their good is 
represented in proxy contestations. This much is certainly true. As representations of the boars’ 
good, proxy contestations would have to be understood on the model of discursive representative 
claim-making (Saward 2006). Here, proxies would claim to represent the boars’ good by 
depicting it in this or that way. For instance, they may depict the boars’ good as consisting in 
wallowing in mud and grubbing for roots free from the arbitrary interfere of humans who would 
render them de facto dependent on feeding stations. The virtue of this discursive model of 
representation as claim-making is that it dispenses with the need to conceive of representation in 
terms of elections and voting—activities in which boars obviously cannot participate (Smith 
2012; Driessen 2014). Indeed, if the good of boars is to be represented by proxies, then it has to 
be on this discursive model of representation.  
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But discursive representations are legitimate only to the extent that they are contestable 
and those purportedly represented by a claim-maker can either accept or reject how they are 
represented. Claims to represent the good of the boars necessarily fail to satisfy this legimitating 
condition of discursive representation. To this extent, claims made by proxies to represent the 
good of boars would have to be reconceived so as to accommodate the weak form of domination. 
What would that mean? Claims to represent the good of boars should be acknowleded as 
legitimate, even though the represented—the boars—cannot contest how they are represented by 
the claim-makers who undertake proxy contestations on their behalf. This would not be 
problematic if the good of boars in relation to humans—hunters, state regulators, or animal rights 
advocates—could be treated as uncontroversial. But that is obviously not so.  
Indeed, their good could be represented in other ways by other human claim-makers with 
different political agendas. Hunters might discursively represent the boars’ good as a plentiful 
food supply in the summer months with the possibility of a clear kill relieving them of the 
agonies of slow starvation through the winter months. Who, then, is to say which representative 
claim is more representative of the boars’ good? That of the proxies claiming to represent the 
boars’ good through contestatons of supplementary feeding practices, or that of the hunters 
claiming to represent the boars’ good through advocacy of such practices? The only 
uncontroversial answer to this question is that it cannot be a boar, for all its cognitive capacities 
that have yet to be revealed. But neither should it be any particular human. Rather, the 
legitimation of claims to represent the boars must be a function of open public deliberation 
among a pluralism of human claim-makers, boar-proxies, hunters, farmers, regulators, ecologists 
and wildlife-managers, and so on. In the language of deliberative democracy familiar from the 
work of Habermas (1985), legitimacy is the outcome of a deliberative process that includes the 
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perspectives of all actors who are potentially affected by a public decision. To this extent, 
legitimacy is the outcome of the unforced force of the better argument.  
Obviously, the boars themselves are affected by the resulting decision, and they are likely 
to be affected in ways that are more fundamental than hunters, farmers, and so on. After all, 
depending on the decision, they could get shot or they could lose a welcome feeding source. But 
the legitimacy of a decision is not forthcoming in any other way. A public decision cannot be said 
to be delegitimized because it is not contested by those whose good has been represented in a 
particular way but who cannot themselves contest this representation. Especially not when claim-
makers and those they claim discursively to represent are already interrelated across species lines. 
Decisions have to be reached and so their legitimation must depend on the robust characters of 
the deliberative process of examining different kinds of representations of the boar’s good and 
assessing their plausibility for satisfying the standard on non-arbitrary interference in light of 
multiple factors. This would include examination of the motivations of different kinds of claim-
makers for self-interested biases in their representations of the boars’ good and a critical survey 
of the scientific literature on the physiological, pathological, ethological, and ecological 
characteristics of boars and the projected impacts of alternative kinds of interferences. But we 
also contend that policy needs to be validated discursively in moral concerns (Habermas 1996). 
To render these recommendations concrete, the wild boar management issue in Sweden as 
well as elsewhere requires appropriate fora at institutional levels. Consistent with our previous 
work (von Essen and Allen 2015), we advocate the creation of deliberative mini-publics targeting 
affected actors with interests in representing the boar and challenging them to defend their 
representation in light of expert and scientific information. We contend the potential for a policy 
solution held as legitimate by all is relatively high, given that the wild boar represents a new 
game species without a management tradition which might otherwise challenge consensus. 
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Unlike the case for more controversial species, such as wolves, practices and ethics toward the 
boar are being continuously negotiated by a wide range of actors, primarily across media 
(Larsson 2014; Olsson 2014).  
We argue a RART-informed political discussion in mini-publics that centres on the place 
of boars in the landscape and our interspecies relations represents a far more constructive 
approach than contesting claims made in media. Moreover, mini-publics of human claim-makers 
not only subjects alternative representations of the boar’s good to critical scrutiny, but also the 
self-representation of hunters as themselves the victims of arbitrary interferences by state 
regulation of their interactions with boars. Indeed, hunters frequently present themselves as the 
victims of domination insofar as hunting regulations may impede their ability to pursue life-plans 
that include taking the lives of non-humans for sport. Such self-representations would be 
problematized just as much as the other-regarding representations offered in public deliberation 
by boar-proxies.  
5. Conclusion: A Republican Framework 
Where does this now leave us with respect to a republican framework for relational 
animal ethics? We began by noting Donaldson and Kymlicka’s political approach to RART 
already pointed in a republican direction. It pointed to republicanism insofar as it explicitly 
problematized liberal freedom as non-interference in abolitionist and hand-off approaches to 
animal rights, instead favouring the integration of negative rights and positive relations. But we 
also signalled certain conceptual weakness in their approach to RART, especially with respect to 
their use of the concepts of sovereignty and representation. Indeed, we have reinterpreted the 
political turn in light of a republican conception of the obligation to ensure that human 
interferences with non-humans satisfy a standard of non-arbitrariness or non-domination.  
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To follow through on this reinterpretation, however, we have argued for a weakening of 
the concept of domination in republican theory. In particular, it must be weakened to 
accommodate agentless domination in which arbitrary interference cannot be understood as 
overriding any sovereign powers of self-determination. Agentless domination, though, encounters 
the problem that boars as dominated cannot undertake contestations of their own relations of 
domination with humans. To compensate for this cognitive and communicative deficit on their 
part, we appealed to proxy contestations in which human proxies purport to represent the good of 
the boars. Here, we attempted to clarify, where Donaldson and Kymlicka do not, the nature of 
such representation by appeal to the idea of contestable representative claim-making. But, again, 
discursive representative claim-making is not contestable by the boars as the represented. 
Consequently, the legitimacy of interferences depends upon a discourse of human agents with 
competing interests in representing the good of boars in publicly contestable ways. Indeed, such a 
discourse may be facilitated by the creation of institutional fora in which differently-interested 
representative claim-makers are challenged to defend their claims regarding the good of boars in 
light of empirical studies and information.  
 All in all, then, we claim to have provided a viable republican framework for RART that 
expands on the work begun by Donaldson and Kymlicka and resolves the weakness in their 
approach with respect to sovereignty and representation. Contrary to them, we have argued that 
sovereignty is not a useful concept for RART and that it should be dropped in light of the 
problem of agentless domination. RART cannot, however, do without a concept of 
representation, but this has to be adapted to the same problem of domination. This is 
accomplished by discursive representation, provided that claims to represent the goods of non-
humans can be robustly contested in appropriate institutional fora challenging the biases and 
epistemic limitations of claim-makers. Our argument has not been concerned with advancing any 
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particular proposal with respect to continuing, discontinuing or regulating feeding stations to any 
greater or lesser extent. Instead, it has been concerned only with advancing a suitable political 
framework of legitimation for reaching justifiable public decisions regarding the latter range of 
options. Any such decisions with respect to what constitutes non-arbitrary interference tracking 
the good of boars and establishing non-dominating inter-species relations with them must survive 
robust deliberative testing across the diverse perspectives of interested claim-makers and experts.  
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however not substantiated by any research. 
